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Education, Reputation or Network?
Evidence from Italy on Migrant Workers employability

Abstract
The strong adverse selection that immigrants face in hosting labour markets may induce them to adopt some
behaviours or signals to modify employers‟ beliefs. Relevant mechanisms for reaching this purpose are personal
reputation; exploiting ethnic networks deeply-rooted in the hosting country; and high educational levels used as
an indirect signal of productivity. On this last point, the immigrant status needs a stronger signal compared to
that necessary for a local worker, and this may lead the immigrant to accept job qualifications which are lower
than those achievable through the embodied educational level. This could explain the over education problem that
characterizes many countries, Italy included.
The aim of the paper is to investigate whether the above mentioned mechanisms are adopted by immigrants in
Italy, a crucial country for EU immigration flows, and if they are useful in increasing immigrants‟ likelihood of
employment. The empirical analysis has been conducted using the dataset from a national Labour Force Survey
which provides information on 6,860 documented immigrants. We estimate a logit model for immigrants‟
likelihood of being employed, focusing on the above mentioned mechanisms: reputation, ethnic networks and
educational level. Moreover we concentrate on the interaction effects of the mechanisms and investigate whether
one of them wins on the others. Results show that each of the three mechanisms is statistically and economically
significant and exert positive influence: all factors contribute to increasing the immigrant‟s probability of being
employed. Anyway, a high level of education increases the probability of being employed more than the
belonging to ethnic networks deeply-rooted in Italy. The specific embodied capital of workers matter relatively
more. This is relevant for labour public policies in this specific realm since the human capital lever is a possible
direct target if various public policies and private human capital investments.
Keywords: Educational qualifications, migrant networks, immigrant employability, reputation, segmented labour
markets
JEL: D82, J24, I2, F22
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1. Introduction
In the last twenty years international migrations have been characterised by sustained increase and deep
changes, that have especially involved the countries of Southern Europe, modifying their role from
emigration areas to hosting countries mostly for people coming from the less developed areas of the
world. This phenomenon has regarded also Italy, where the migration phenomenon has reached a
considerable weight. Actually, in 2008 the foreign presence in Italy has been evaluated in more than 4
million people, with a percentage of undocumented people evaluated of about 8,7%. Documented
workers are 1,5 million and, including the moonlighting, migrant workforce sums up at 2 million units.
Foreign people in Italy are, moreover, characterized by an average age of 32 years (versus 44 years of
Italians). For what concerns education level, 49% of foreigners holds at least a college degree, versus
33,2% of Italians.
The high education level of migrants is a phenomenon already exploited in many recent works about
migration (Barringer, Takeuchi and Xenos 1990, Borjas 2003, Battu and Sloane 2002, Devillanova and
Frattini 2006, Gross and Schmitt 2006). What emerges with strength is a situation of over education:
migrant workers holds higher education levels than local workers for same job positions.
Usually the inclusion of foreign people in the host country comes with an attitude of residents often
not in favour of immigration, although the socio-economic benefits of the phenomenon are very often
visible and clear even at first sight. This negative attitude exerts its effects in the labour market, where
adverse selection factors undermine the proper matching between supply and demand.
The adverse selection that can be met by migrants in hosting labour markets may induce them to adopt
some behaviours or signals to modify employers‟ beliefs. Relevant mechanisms at reaching this purpose
are: personal reputation, belonging to ethnic networks deeply-rooted in the hosting country, and high
education levels as an indirect signal of productivity. On this last point, the immigrant status needs a
“stronger” signal than that necessary for a local worker, and this may lead the immigrant to accept
lower job positions. This could explain the over education problem highlighted above.
The main aim of the paper is to investigate whether the mentioned mechanisms are adopted by
immigrants in Italy, and if they are useful levers in increasing migrants‟ likelihood of employment.
The empirical analysis has been conducted using an official dataset provided by the National Institute
of Statistics (ISTAT), collecting information about 6860 documented immigrants in Italy. We estimate a
logit model for immigrants‟ likelihood of being employed, focusing on the above mentioned
mechanisms: reputation, ethnic networks and education level. Moreover we concentrate on the
interaction effects and the marginal effects of the mechanisms and investigate whether one of them
wins on the others.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two is devoted to the conceptual framework that will
constitute the basis for the empirical analysis. In section three the database and the social context are
presented. Section four comments on and presents the empirical framework, focusing on the drivers of
employability for migrants in our sample and on the interaction effects and marginal effects of
reputation, migrant networks and education level as levers of migrants‟ employability. The last section
concludes the paper by summarising results and offering some insights for policy making.
2. Conceptual framework
The mismatch between education level and job position in migrant workers has been pointed out by
many authors1, who, for different countries and situations, have verified a higher education level in
migrant workers compared with local workers for same job positions.
In the human capital theory higher levels of education have positive impacts on the advancement of
minorities, increasing their likelihood of more satisfying jobs, higher incomes and career prospects2.
Nevertheless in presence of a phenomenon of over education, the predictions of the human capital
1

Barringer, Takeuchi and Xenos (1990) for Asian migrants in Us, Borjas (2003) for the US, Battu and Sloane (2002) for UK,
Devillanova and Frattini (2006) for irregular migrants in Italy, Gross and Schmitt (2006) for France. In some countries, as
Australia, over education has been exploited by a proper legislation of welcoming more educated immigrants (Kifle, 2008)
2 Berg (1969), Parsons (1968). See Peterson (1971), Sklare (1971) and Sung (1967) for the economic achievements of high
educated minorities as Jews and Asian Americans.
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theory do not fit well. In the structural critique3 to the human capital theory, the existence of structural
barriers prevents migrants from obtaining a job coherent with their education level.
A fundamental element for the inclusion of foreign people in the host country is the attitude of
residents, which is often not in favour of immigration, although the socio-economic benefits of the
phenomenon are very often visible and clear even at first sight if not from specific micro and macro
analyses. This negative attitude exerts its effects in the labour market, where adverse selection factors
undermine the proper matching between supply and demand from the very beginning, even influencing
migrant‟s likelihood of entering the labour market.
Migrants aim at modifying employers beliefs by adopting mechanisms that may mitigate or tackle such
adverse selection effects.
Reputation is definitely the major factor migrants may use when entering the labour market. A migrant
may then base his reputation and competitive advantage on two distinct mechanisms. The first one
structures “personal reputation” on the specific experience and curriculum vitae the worker
accumulates over time if staying in the same labour market. The second one relies on the so called
„migrant networks‟, or complex webs of interpersonal links that join migrants with „older‟ migrants and
non migrants in the locations of origin and arrival, through family, friendship and ethnic connections
(Massey, 1988). From the employer point of view, the link with other employees that have provided a
good effort and behaviour is a criterion of selection and valuation. We may refer to the theory of
„statistical discrimination‟ (Becker 1959, Arrow 1972, 1973, 1998; Phelps 1972, Heckman 1998), by
which one applies to a single individual the characteristics of the network the worker belongs to.
A further mechanism aimed at modifying employer‟s beliefs is the use by workers of the education level
as an indirect signal of workers productivity (Spence, 1973; Riley, 1979). The migrant status makes
necessary a stronger signal compared to the resident competitor. This often induces or forces the
migrant to step down from the proper segment of labour markets, descending to a lower market in
terms of education levels. This explains in part the phenomenon of over education we commented on
above. More in detail, the education signal sent to the market should be even stronger for newcomers4,
migrants without a solid reputation and networks as embodied assets, or migrants belonging to
communities for which the social attitude is specifically negative5.
On the basis of the considerations made above, our aim is to analyse the behaviour of migrants in the
Italian job market. We want particularly verify the extent to which the highlighted mechanisms are
exploited by migrants and the way they affect the likelihood of being employed.
3. Data and description of the socio-economic context
In order to fulfil the aims of this work the analysis is carried out by examining an official dataset
provided by the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT)6 of 6,860 migrant units, regularly living in Italy.
More specifically, in order to empirically analyse the determinants of employability for the sample, we
only consider potential „workforce‟ units, people between 15 and 75 years (87% of the sample). The
sample possesses the following features. Women are the 57.3% of workforce. Main countries of
origins, besides Germany and Switzerland, EU countries placed at third and first positions in the
ranking, are: Albania, Romania (when writing the most numerous communities in Italy) and Morocco.
Those three constitute the 20% of the total. 55.7% of migrants live in Northern Italy. Their average age
is 38 years, and 59% of them are married. Some other descriptive statistics are useful to sketch the
overall socio economic framework under analysis. As far as the labour market is concerned, 57.6% of
the people is employed, 35% is inactive and 6.6% unemployed. Among employed, 40% is working in
3

See, among others, Barringer, Takeuchi and Xenos (1990).
Which is in line with the idea that the first international migrants usually do not come from the bottom of the community
hierarchy, but from the middle ranges (Massey, 1988).
5
E.g. Africans and Romanian in Italy, compared to southern Americans who are more easily accepted for cultural and
crime-related reasons.
6 Data are not publicly free. We bought from ISTAT a sufficient amount of data for the analysis in 2006. Data stem from
the Labour workforce survey ISTAT carries out every three months on employed and unemployed people. We got the first
semester of 2006. Future analyses may further exploit panel based structure of the data. One problem is the unbalanced
nature of labour force workers survey due to the partial rotation (turnover) of the panel semester by semester.
4
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services, 36% in industry and the rest in agricultural sector. 85% of them have a job with a tenure track
(not atypical job) position.
Finally, regarding education we note that 45% possess primary or high school diploma, 39% a
secondary school degree and 11% a University Laurea degree or even Master/PhD7. If we look at job
positions of employed workers in the sample, having in mind as comparison the shares of education
attainments, we observe that 75% of migrants are „blue collars‟ (table 1), with a striking difference
between Italians and migrants. Further, it is evident that migrants occupy a non coherent job compared
to education levels: 34% of them with university degree and 69% of people with a diploma are blue
collar (Tab. 2). Over education then emerges as a stylized fact on which our reasoning may revolve
around. Migrants then tend to embody, taking as parameter a similar job/position in the market, higher
education levels.
Tab. 1: job positions of Italians and migrants in our sample
Job position
Blue collar
White collar
Director/head

Migrants in the sample
(%)
75,3
19,8
4,9

Italians
(%)
34,7
27,1
38,2

100,0

100,0

Total
Source: Istat (2007),own elaborations

Tab. 2: Education levels and job positions of migrants in our sample
Job

Education level
(%)

High

Medium

Basic

No education

Blue collar
White collar
Director/head

34,0
38,1
27,9

68,5
27,9
3,6

92,3
7,2
0,5

94,3
5,7
0,0

Total

100,0

100,0

100,0

100,0

Source: Istat (2007), own elaborations

The phenomenon of over education is even clearer if we subdivide migrants in those coming
from developed and less developed areas of the world. The latter present stronger mismatch between
education level and job position in the market (tab. 3). We note that for individuals coming from more
developed areas a positive correlation between education and job levels is implied. Foreigners having
high education are either white collar (55%) or head positions (42%), while less educated are for the
great majority blue collars (87%). The opposite is true for migrants coming from less developed areas:
61% of high educated is blue collar; 23% white collar and only 18% in head positions. For those having
a medium education level, the difference is also striking: 55% of migrants coming from more developed
areas is white collar, 84% of those born in less developed areas is blue collar. From any angle and
perspective, then, over education in the job market is an issue worth studying.
Tab. 3: Distribution by job, country and education level
Job
High

Education
(%)
Medium

Basic

No education

More developed areas
Blue collar
White collar
Director/head

3,2
55,1
41,7

37,6
54,6
7,9

86,2
13,8
0,0

100,0
0,0
0,0

Total

100,0

100,0

100,0

100,0

7

We note that in data from Italy‟s General Census of Population the same percentages for Italians were 56%, 26%, 7%.
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Less developed areas
Blue collar
White collar
Director/head

60,5
22,8
16,7

84,4
14,1
1,5

94,5
4,9
0,6

94,8
5,2
0,0

Total

100,0

100,0

100,0

100,0

Source: Istat (2007),own elaborations

Starting from the mismatch between high education level and jobs migrants get in the Italian
marketplace, we comment on the fundamental issue at the basis of the present work. If in fact,
education (certification) and then in general the education level, does not represent the means by which
a migrant obtain a coherent job, it is necessary to analyse if education is a mechanism adopted by
migrants, in substitution or together with reputation, to modify Italian employers‟ beliefs, just for
entering the labour market.
The aim is to verify the extent to which mechanisms such as education and reputation are exploited by
migrants in Italy as levers of employability, and the way they affect the likelihood of being employed.
4. Empirical analyses
4.1 The empirical model
In order to analyze the drivers of employability for migrants in our sample, we describe the
empirical/econometric framework. We use a basic logit model, estimating the likelihood of being
employed8. The logit model we use as framework is then in brief:
If y  y i , y i  0,1,i 1,...,T, where y i , is a binary dependent variable, and T sample size T.
The logit model assumes:



exp[ f (x i )]
Pr(y i  1) 
1 exp[ f (x i )]
k

Where x i  (x1i ,..., x ik ) is the
regressors vector and f (x i )   0    i x ij .
j1

The dependent variable of our empirical model is the binary index EMP (assuming value 1 if the
migrant is employed)9. Among covariates (described also in table 4), we focus mainly on those factors
that capture ways used to modify employers beliefs.
 effect of variable Xj‟ the partial derivative of f (not of the
We define in the comments below „marginal
estimated probability) with respect to Xj. We will then deal with proper marginal effects after
commenting on the main results of the logit estimates.

Further analyses may be carried out extending the reasoning to order logit models that take into account the type of jobs
people get.
9 We refer to table 4 for a summary of variables used in the analysis.
8
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Table 4 – Description of dependent and independent variables
Acronym
EMP (b)
GEND (b)
AGE
CIV1 (b)
CIV2 (b)10
CIV3 (b)
ZONE1,2,4,5(b)

Description
Employment status (1 employed)
Gender, 1 if male
Age of workers
1 if widow
1 if married
1 if divorced
Geographical Dummies (1north east, 2north west, 4south,
5islands)11
Educational level dummies (1PhD and university, 3secondary
school, 4no level)12
Years of staying in the country 13
14 main dummies capturing countries of origins of the workers14

EDUC1,3,4(b)
RES
COUNTRY1-16 (b)
(b) Means Binary

Tab. 5: Dummies for the first 15 countries in the sample

Country_1
Country _2
Country _3
Country _4
Country _5
Country _6
Country _7
Country _8
Country _9
Country _10
Country _11
Country _12
Country _13
Country _14
Country _15
Country_16

Country
Switzerland
Albania
Germany
Romania
France
Morocco
Macedonia
Argentina
Polonia
Ukraine
Belgium
Brazil
Philippines
UK
Tunisia
Residual 112 countries (22,287 migrants in the sample)

4.2 Employability analysis

We now comment on the main results deriving from econometric analyses (table 615). Among
individual features, we find many significant drivers of employability. Being male increases the
likelihood of finding a job, as well as AGE exerts a positive influence, with an interesting concave
dynamics: the benefit of getting older shows plausible diminishing marginal effects over time.
The likelihood instead decreases for married women (the coefficient is that linked to CIV2), while it
increases for married men (CIV2*GEND captures this result). Finally, employability is logically higher
in north east Italy, and lower in the South and Islands (Sicily, Sardinia), the less developed areas of the
country16.
The signal provided by the factor EDUC is statistically significant and confirms what proposed above.
In particular, higher education levels increases the likelihood of being employed, while lower ones or no
title at all decrease that probability. Then, it means that if on the one hand education levels are not
drivers of job positions, they assume a key meaning for employability as such.
Education levels are a way migrants use to influence and modify employer‟s beliefs.
An interaction term between CIV2 and GEN is also created.
Central Italy is the excluded one.
12 College is the excluded factor.
13 1 means less then one year, 11 more than eleven.
14 See table 5. Tunisia is the excluded factor.
15 All regressions present high statistical performances in terms of fit and correctly predicted values.
16 We remark that the value added per capita ranges from values of around 23000-30000€ in the north and 12-14000€ in the
south.
10
11
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Reputation is captured here by the factor RES, which is included in association to its squared term, and
by the country of origins dummies COUNTRY1-14. RES as well as AGE shows a significant and
economically plausible couple of positive and negative terms, identifying a concave relationship:
marginal benefits of staying in the country fade away over time.
The country of origin also exert as expected the following influence on employability. Positive links to
EMP are shown for Switzerland, Albania, Romania, Ukraine, Philippines; those are mostly representing
very strong regarding inclusion and large ethnic groups in Italy, apart from Swiss people17. Summing up,
being part of an embedded and historically present community increases the individual likelihood of
being employed. Albanians and Philippines are associated to quite low or absent education level
(around 60% of those workers). 64% of migrant from Philippines have lived in Italy for 10 years and
more (table 7). Migrants coming from such places tend to adopt reputation strategies in a
comprehensive meaning in order to affect employer‟s beliefs and increase employability opportunities.
Tab. 6: logistic regression (1)
Number of obs = 5986
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2
= 0.2744
Log likelihood = -2959.6365

Logistic regression
EMP

Coef.

z

P>|z|

GEND
AGE
AGE2

0.7931047
0.4143748
-0.0052088

7.67
24.46
-25.67

0.000
0.000
0.000

CIV2
CIV2*GEND
CIV3

-0.9536369
1.632011
0.6488868

-9.38
11.29
4.22

0.000
0.000
0.000

CIV1
ZONE1
ZONE 2
ZONE 4
ZONE 5
EDUC1
EDUC3
EDUC4
RES
RES2
Country_1
Country _2
Country _3
Country _4
Country _5
Country _6
Country _7
Country _8
Country _9
Country _10
Country _11
Country _12
Country _13
Country _14
Country _16
_cons

0.013926
0.1764397
0.2895298
-0.522632
-0.4017026
0.2436025
-0.4363291
-0.3684178
0.3220897
-0.0179987
0.5883272
0.6675524
0.2748442
1.061223
0.3328498
0.1576163
0.0248208
0.4171235
0.5051599
1.451889
0.45233
0.3518658
2.074475
0.5126857
0.5504545
-8.797021

0.07
1.75
2.90
-4.84
-2.85
2.20
-6.07
-2.34
4.56
-3.68
2.12
2.38
0.98
3.64
1.12
0.54
0.07
1.27
1.55
4.04
1.35
1.01
5.29
1.50
2.10
-18.63

0.946
0.080
0.004
0.000
0.004
0.028
0.000
0.020
0.000
0.000
0.034
0.017
0.327
0.000
0.262
0.591
0.941
0.204
0.122
0.000
0.179
0.312
0.000
0.135
0.035
0.000

Positive predictive value
Negative predictive value
Correctly classified
17

Pr( D| +) 77.34%
Pr(~D| -) 72.50%
75.43%

98% of those have Italian citizenship.
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As far as Romania and Ukraine are concerned, instead, we note a high education level which is typical
of eastern EU migrants (around 65% with college degree and above) and a period of staying generally
shorter than five years. We observe that the education level is a key factor to compensate for a generally
lower reputation (the period of staying is shorter; moreover eastern EU, mainly males, do not benefit
from positive attitude depending on high crime rates brought about by such communities, including the
critical issue of „gypsies minorities‟ coming from Romania that live in Italy), at least if compared to
Philippines, who are highly integrated even for religious reasons (catholic religion).
Tab. 7: Education and years of permanence in Italy (for those arising relevant in the analysis)
Country
Education
Years of permanence in Italy
(%)
(%)
Medium high
Basic
Total
1-5 years
5-10 years
>10 years

Total

Albania
Philippines
Romania
Ukraine

100,0
100,0
100,0
100,0

34,0
41,6
63,3
65,8

66,0
58,4
36,7
34,2

100,0
100,0
100,0
100,0

30,4
14,2
49,3
54,7

39,6
21,2
35,9
34,2

30,0
64,6
14,8
11,1

Source: own elaboration from Istat data (2006)

4.3 Education level, personal reputation or network?
It is now worth analysing more in depth three mechanisms that may be adopted to affect the set of
employer‟s beliefs: personal reputation, membership to a well integrated community, education level.
Table 8 presents the results of an additional econometric exercise, based on a reduced number of
covariates, but focusing on new variables and some factor‟s interactions we describe in brief.
Among new variables specifications, PR1 is a dummy that associates the value 1 to the first 15
communities in terms of size. Differently from the 14 dummies we used above, we now rely on the
effective size of communities in Italy. Such 15 countries18 represent 37.3% of people in our sample.
EDUCAT is instead a dummy assuming value 1 if the worker holds at least a college degree.
We then insert in the analysis interactions between mechanisms, specifically interactions between RES,
PR1 and EDUCAT.
The regression below in table 8 shows the following main facts. PR1 is statistically significant and
positive in its sign: the economic meaning is that belonging to strong migrant network increases
employability. This result confirms and makes more robust what we also found above. RES is again
relevant as commented on above. EDUCAT re-confirms the value of possessing high level degrees.
The factors we analysed in the first regression are all emerging significant even if slightly modified. We
will below focus on their ranking in terms of economic significance, by calculating the effective
marginal effects on the probability of being employed.
Let us focus now on the interaction terms we test in the regression.
First, PR1*RES captures the eventual difference in reputation effects between workers belonging or
not to dense „migrant networks‟ such as those envisaged. Its coefficient is negative and significant,
showing that RES increases the probability of employment relatively less for people belonging to
strongly integrated communities. In order to measure the overall effect19 we should sum the two
coefficients linked to RES and PR1*RES; it is positive and significant. Belonging to network and being
in the country for a long time increases employability, though with a joint effect which is lower than
those associated to the single factors we analyse (RES and PR1).
Secondly, PR1*EDUCAT is not statistically significant, at least at a 5% threshold. Its negative sign,
when we join PR1 and EDUC, leads to a positive and significant coefficient: belonging to a network
and having a high degree increases the likelihood of being employed, with respect to the state of not
From ISTAT data, these countries in 2006 are ordered as follows: Albania, Romania, Morocco, China, Ukraine, Polonia,
Philippines, Tunisia, India, Serbia, Perù, Moldova, Ecuador, Senegal, Egypt.
19 With reference to the people coming from PR1 countries.
18
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belonging to a community network and having a low quality degree, though as before with an
economic significance which is lower compared to that of the two single factors accounted separately.
Third, RES*EDUCAT is also not significant, even at 10%. The significant sum of the coefficient
shows that high level degrees and long staying in Italy increases employability. As above, the joint effect
is less economically significant with respect to the separately accounted factors20.
Tab. 8: logistic (2)
Number of obs = 5986
Pseudo R2
= 0.2645
Log likelihood = -3000.306

Logistic regression

EMP
GEND
AGE
AGE2
CIV2
CIV2*GEND
CIV3
CIV1
ZONE1
ZONE 2
ZONE 4
ZONE 5
PR_1
RES
EDUCAT
PR_1*RES
PR_1*EDUCAT
RES*EDUCAT
cons

Coef.

z

P>|z|

0.7046045
0.421424
-0.0052769
-1.02591
1.675685
0.6386607
0.0569196
0.1107068
0.2244251
-0.5632523
-0.4601715
0.8717461
0.0887429
0.739032
-0.0482933
-0.2655792
-0.0115065
-8.451797

7.00
25.89
-26.91
-10.42
11.89
4.31
0.28
1.14
2.30
-5.31
-3.39
4.14
4.68
3.25
-2.17
-1.87
-0.52
-23.29

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.777
0.255
0.021
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.030
0.061
0.603
0.000

Tab. 9: Linear combinations of variables
RES + PR_1*RES = 0
EDUCAT + PR_1*EDUCAT = 0
EDUCAT + RES*EDUCAT = 0

Coef.
0.0404496
0.4734528
0.7275255

Std. Err.
0.0185868
0.1919594
0.2071777

z
2.18
2.47
3.51

P>|z|
0.030
0.014
0.000

We now describe and comment on marginal effects, which add food to the economic explanation of
econometric results.
As previously noted, we define here as „marginal effect of variable Xj‟ the partial derivative of function f
with respect to Xj, and not of the estimated probability. This choice depends on the fact that we are
interested in finding the marginal effects of the statistical significance of variables, and not their
quantitative effect on the variation of estimated probability. As usual, the marginal effect is calculated at
the average level. We use in this case the average level of EDUCAT (0.498) and PR1 (0.377), while we
use the median for RES (11)21 given the different nature of the variable. Tables below 10 and 11 show
marginal effects and their differences.
The marginal effect of PR1, RES and EDUCAT are all significant and positive. The analysis of the
differences (evaluated for the same values of the variables, mean and median) may show a ranking of
economic significances. Marginal effects even show some insights: EDUCAT possesses a larger size in
the coefficient, followed by RES and PR1. We nevertheless note that the only significant difference
between levels of coefficients is between EDUCAT and PR1, while in the other two remaining cases
the effect is not statistically different. In terms of economic meaning, we may only affirm that
20
21

Table 9 shows the economic and statistical significance of the sum of coefficients as commented on in the text.
RES=11 means being in Italy for more than 11 years. 59% of the sample belongs to the state „11‟.

9
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2009

9

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 309 [2009]

education level plays a major role compared to that of “migrant network” in generating higher
employment likelihood for migrants. All other factors impact with the same economic importance if we
compare the relative influences as above; that is, EDUCAT and PR1 and RES and PR1 show impacts
which are not different on a joint economic and statistical assessment.
Tab. 10: Marginal effects
PR1
RES
EDUCAT

Coef.
0.207996
0.4116899
0.5123246

Std. Err.
0.0938993
0.0903799
0.0825536

z
2.22
4.56
6.21

P>|z|
0.027
0.000
0.000

Coef.
-0.203694
-0.3043286
-0.1006347

Std. Err.
0.1498652
0.1205864
0.127157

z
-1.36
-2.52
-0.79

P>|z|
0.174
0.012
0.429

Tab. 11: Differences in marginal effects
PR1 – RES
PR1 – EDUCAT
RES – EDUCAT

5. Conclusions
The analysis underlines very important results regarding the adoption and effectiveness of mechanisms
adopted by immigrants in Italy in order to modify employer‟s beliefs and then their employability. First,
it emerges that all factors workers may use as strategic assets in the labour market – reputation, migrant
networks and education level – positively influence the probability of being employed. We may infer
that such factors in some cases could exert effects as alternative drivers. In fact, we observe that for a
part of workers high reputation and network migrants factors compensate the low education levels in
driving employability (e.g. Philippines), while in other cases (Eastern EU people) high education levels
compensate lower networking and reputation standards. Thus, different migrants use different strategic
mechanisms as signals to the labour market and as levers of employability.
Focusing the attention on the three key drivers of employability and interaction effects, it nevertheless
does not appear they exclude each other systematically, insofar their combined effects increase the
likelihood of being employed. It remains true that the joint effect is lower in its „economic size‟ as a
phenomenon if compared to the two single effects taken separately, and this is true for all three couples
examined regarding reputation, migrant networks and education level.
The investigation of marginal effects reveals other insights on the economic relevance of the socioeconomic factors we analyse. Based on the three significant marginal effects, the analysis of differences
between their levels (the relevance) shows that the only meaningful one is between education and
migrant networking. Education level, in the end, plays a major role compared to the still relevant effect
of community membership. This results could present a benefit for such migrants (e.g. eastern EU
workers) associated to higher education level and somewhat low reputation and weaker community
links, depending on the one hand on high effective and perceived crime rates associated to some
eastern EU communities and on the other hand on their historically „younger‟ experience in the Italian
labour market. In fact, the eastern EU immigration began after the collapse of the soviet world and
intensified since the late nineties. The migrant networking effect may well improve over time,
enhancing its employment relevance, which is now greater for historically old communities, such as
Philippines among others, which nevertheless suffer from lower education levels. Over a dynamic
scenario, such elements of reasoning could also provide food for thought for policy making. In fact, we
may expect a relatively increasing stronger weight in the labour market on the side of eastern EU
workers, who have also increased more in recent years in terms of size of the population. Weakness
could one day emerge for other communities that rely on reputation as the only strategic asset, if
eastern EU people strengthen their networking, eventually improve their reputation, and if other
communities do not invest in human capital, instead of only using reputation effects as performance
drivers. Training, education and labour markets policies should focus on enhancing human capital for
relatively weaker migrants in this realm, while other public policies may focus on crime rates and the
10
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lower reputation other migrants suffer from. Public policies tackling market failures could be a part of
the solution towards increased employability and more coherent matching between education level and
jobs.
This latter point – the mis match- is an ancillary but relevant objective of labour policies that generates
high social costs. In the case of migrants, the perpetuating absence of a proper matching between
education level and job position could discourage educated people to migrate to Italy, especially when
migrant communities increase their stability and their migrant networks in the country. In this case, as
the theory of statistical discrimination predicts “it is indeed very easy to say how social segregation can
give rise to labour market segregation through network referrals” (Arrow, 1998, p.97). In the presence
of such a human capital waste, the risk for the Italian job market is that of losing high educated
migrant workers and of perpetuating a situation in which migrants will be employed just in low
occupational levels. The present (actual) supply of highly educated migrants in the Italian job market is
a chance that deserves much more consideration by policy makers.
Given the migrants have explained and will explain a large part of employment performances of Italy
and other EU countries, and labour supply is mainly increasing due to migrants and women entering
the labour market, the social cost of lower employability and mismatching are to be mitigated as much
as possible.
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